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    Archives for February 2018

    Augustine’s Critique of Philosophy

    February 27, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Augustine: Confessions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. William Watts translation, revised by W. H. D. Rowse.

     

    If the liberation offered by the liberal arts culminates in the philosophic life, and the philosophic life culminates in in in the trial and death of the philosopher at the command of the city, Christianity demurs. Christianity begins in humility; not wonder but fear of the Lord is the beginning of its wisdom. As Ann Hartle observed some years ago, a confession is the opposite of an apologia. Confession is humble, the opposite of presumptuous self-defense (VII. xx. 395).

    Augustine devotes the first book of his Confessions entirely to prayer. His only judge is God—not the people, not his philosophic friends, least of all himself. And he admits his guilt forthwith.

    Early education is a metaphor for man’s relationship with God: no one wants to go to school, but it’s good for you (I. viii. 30). God’s school is much better for you than the schools of men. The liberal arts are mere ornaments of pride; the truth is humblingly simple. Two plus two equals four, no matter what rhetorical embellishments human learning can add. Rhetoric stems from vanity, the desire “to content the eyes of mortals” instead of God (II. I. 65). Men do evil apparently for the thrill of liberation, love passion for the sake of the feeling of passion, but really only to please other men (II. iii-viii). Philosophy or the love of wisdom is only the most refined form of love for human admiration. (The ‘modern’ or Machiavellianized version of this claim is Nietzsche’s: philosophy in only the most refined form of the will to power.)

    Augustine’s philosophy and his Manichaeanism contradicted each other. Philosophy can refute false religious doctrines (V. iii. 211; VI. xiv. 259, 261). False religions typically make claims to control the natural world, but philosophy really does understand nature as it stands, if not in its origin. Pseudo-religious niaiseries quickly succumb to philosophic scrutiny.

    The vanity of public display, the rhetoric of the philosophic life, caused Augustine to become “a great riddle to myself” (IV. iv. 161). Contra the philosophers, philosophy cannot bring self-knowledge precisely because it must become politic and is at core social, vain. One cannot know what never stops changing: the self is driven by the passions, especially the passions of the crowd. In the central book of the Confessions Augustine confesses, “I was not able to discern my very self” (VII. I. 335). “I stood with my back to the light, and with my face towards those things that receive that light” (IV. xvi. 199). This is Socrates’ image, but Augustine replaces the Good with God. “The good that you love is from Him” (IV. xii. 181).

    Turning from the crowd, Augustine examines his own soul. He sees that he has a will, which chooses good and evil (VII. iii. 343). Over the mind that examines itself and the rest of the soul is the light of God. ‘Over’ means not only ‘superior to’ but ‘prior to’: Whence came this soul, this willing mind, if not from a creator-God, that is, one who first of all wills? If corruption is a fading-away of being, then is genesis not the source of goodness, of strength of being or virtue? The Creator who can create such a being as man makes Augustine not wonder like a philosopher but “tremble with love and horror” (VII. x. 373). “I learned to rejoice with trembling” at the thought of such a powerful God (VII. xxi. 397). “Thou has created us for thyself, and our heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in thee” (I. I. 3). Although introspection is necessary, it is insufficient. You cannot know yourself directly; your own passions preclude such knowledge. You can only know yourself by knowing your Creator, who knows you because He created you. Seneca advises: Let your true ancestors be the philosophers. Augustine replies: Your true father is God.

    Both the philosophers and the Christians see the conflicts of the human soul. Philosophers see a battle among the elements of the soul itself—reason versus spirit versus appetites. Christians see the soul more as a battlefield where spiritual beings contend for rule: angels and demons, God and Satan. But in Augustine these spiritual beings approach the soul through the mind in the form of opinions. Bad people are not by nature any worse than good people; good people too are by nature fallen, inclined toward evil. Bad people are rather those who believe bad opinions; good people are those who believe good opinions (VIII. x. 451). In this, Augustine follows Paul in I Timothy 1:10 on “sound doctrine.)

    This is why Christianity must open itself to philosophy with deadly seriousness, while at the same time must firmly rule it. Without a detailed legal code or praxis, as in Judaism or Islam, Christianity faces a paradox. “The unlearned start up and take heaven by violence, and we with all our learning, see how easily we wallow in flesh and blood!” (VIII. viii. 443). The unlearned easily accept right opinion. The learned must think before the accept, and are easily misled by corrupt thought-processes. Thus the audience of the Confessions cannot be God, to whom it seems to be addressed—why confess to an omniscient being?—but learned men, students of the liberal arts (II. iii. 71).

    We happy few? You will find your true friends only among those who are truly good. Aristotle says as much, but Augustine adds: The truly good share the same opinions, they share the Holy Spirit (IV. iv. 159). Given the immortality in Heaven of right-minded souls, you will never lose a true friend. (I once talked to a Christian college professor who regretted the death of an unbelieving friend because “I’ll never see her again.” Augustine would have had to convince him that she had not been a true friend. Augustinianism need not take second place to Stoicism in the severity of the love and the liberation it offers.)

    How then shall the learned few be brought to believe? Unlike Socrates, who knows he does not know and lives with that knowledge, the young Augustine sought certain knowledge (VI. iv. 279). He wanted to be as certain in spiritual matters as he was of arithmetic truths. God rectified his heart by causing him to reflect upon the many things he believed that he could not see; “we could do nothing at all in this life” without such beliefs (VI. v. 283), such as reports of reliable witnesses of cities we have never seen and of medical remedies we have never tried. The reports of Scripture, preached “among all the nations” (VI. v. 283), supplements the human-all-too-human inability to find the truth by “evident reason” (VI. v. 285). Unassisted human reason cannot account for its own genesis, and must therefore depend upon reports. What the Bible reports are the right opinions brought by the Holy Spirit which alone make human souls good—happy because they have rediscovered their true nature or origin as images of God.

    Human souls confirm the truth of the Holy Spirit not first of all by thinking but by first of all believing—by gaining a knowledge available only by means of believing because it is a knowledge granted, not achieved. To Socrates Augustine replies: What you know you do not know is what you most need to know, and you can know it only if you first believe the true reports of the Holy Spirit as He spoke through His prophets. Only after you believe those reports is the Holy Spirit likely to speak to you as well, although the Holy Spirit has been known to speak in a still, small voice to unbelievers. Only then will the question of human origins be answered for you. The right questions are not ‘What is?’ (the ancient philosophers) or ‘How?’ (the modern philosophers) but ‘Who?’ and ‘Where from?’

    This is why, before philosophizing, Augustine prays to the most authoritative Person: “Courage, my mind, and press on strongly. God is our helper, he made us, and not we ourselves.” (XI. xxvii. 264). Unassisted human reason can understand nature ‘as it stands,’ refuting the charlatanries of astrologers. But unassisted human reason cannot understand the origin of nature, cannot understand nature as a whole as it exists in time.

    Augustine’s meditations on time (Book XI0 and on substance (Book XII) both concern origins. His meditation on time is a meditation on the beginning of time, where the Bible narrative itself begins. This meditation is a ‘baptized’ version of the philosopher’s ‘eternal present’—now truly eternal and truly present because Augustine acknowledges the Creator-God. The meditation on substance is a meditation on chaos, the first substance, the stuff the Creator-God shaped.

    To be, to know, to will: One being ‘does’ all these; the knowledge of the Creator-God is creative as no ‘god of the philosophers’ can be. What the Creator-God wills is absolutely coterminous with what He does and knows. Human art is only weakly analogous to this; it is merely productive, not truly ‘original’ or creative. The coterminousness of being, knowing, and willing are more analogous to the three-personed God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. A being that is knowing and willing—whose very being deliberately creates—is one person and three.

    For a Christian, to love wisdom is to love God. But this love differs from philosophic love in two ways. To love God is to love a person. A person is not a form, nor is it ‘the Good’—which, in Plato, somehow accounts for the forms. A form can be ‘seen’; it is an object of noēsis. A person can be seen externally, but not fully understood by sight. A person’s soul also can be known as it were externally, by classifying it as to its ‘type.’ And a person can be known intimately but remain surprising in ways that a form, once known, cannot be. God says: “My thoughts are not your thoughts.” And some of God’s creations—angels, men—can surprise God, rebel against Him, change their minds and thereby induce God to change His mind—as he does more than once in the Bible. God knows man much better than man knows God, but man, being a person too, having free will, retains a touch of opacity even in the eyes of God.

    The Christian love of God differs from philosophic love in a second way. The Confessions is is no more a Symposium than it is an Apology. To desire the wisdom and power of God would lead not to the Cross but to Machiavelli. Agapic love is neither erotic nor ‘philiac,’ friendly. God is not our beloved or our friend. Even as God does not love human beings erotically or as a friend—why would he need or desire or buddy up with an inferior?—God properly loves man agapically, as does man love God. Agapic love can be between unequals. In Greek, agape refers to brotherly love, or the mature fondness of a husband and wife; it is the only kind of love associated with justice.

    God’s knowledge of man is superior to man’s knowledge of himself because God is the creator of man. “There is some thing of man, that the very spirit of man that is in him, knoweth not. But thou knowest all of him, who made him.” (X. iv. 85)  To create is to know in a way that the introspective philosopher wants but cannot do; it surpasses even the self-knowledge that comes from dialogue with other people. God’s knowledge is the only kind that is intrinsically efficacious, a perfect fusion of theory and practice. Machiavelli and his followers (most spectacularly, the Germans) attempt to know man by making him a self-creating being. The results are more impressive than felicitous.

    At best, man knows by seeing, first, that the senses collect data but do not bring knowledge. He then sees that sounds are not the things signified by the sounds, as sounds differ from language. Neither sense impressions nor words by themselves yield knowledge. As for the operations of the mind, memory in the simplest sense—memory of sense impressions including those made by words—does not bring knowledge. Animals have such memory. To know, one needs the Platonic notion of ‘remembering.’ ‘Remembering’ or seeing the forms must then be reconciled with the God of the Bible. Unlike such disguised ‘Christian’ Platonists as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, Augustine really does adapt Platonism to Christianity (and not the other way around) by asserting that the core memory is the ‘memory’ of God in oneself, the self created in the image of God. This image is not darkened by ‘selfishness’—actually false selfishness or love of corporeal things. Love of things aims at the created, not the Creator. Just as God’s crating is as much will as knowledge, so man must “make choice of thee” in order to know God (X. ii. 77). Only in such choosing can such knowledge be had.

    Against Plato, Augustine maintains that there can be no noble lie. God and a lie “cannot be possessed together” (X. xli. 199) precisely because God is a creator. Divine truth is persuasive by itself—creative or transforming. When he writes “On Lies” Augustine permits, at most, misdirection. Lies are human pseudo-creations, apings of God—private, one’s own, like sin. God and Word are seamless; His creating Word is eternal, wisdom’s self (XI. ix. 229). To the philosophers, by contrast, wisdom has no self. It is an attribute of a self.

    Augustine answers not only Plato but Nietzsche and Foucault, in advance. To Nietzsche he says: Wisdom and life are one in God’s creating Word (XI. ix). Light is the first of all created things because God’s mind is enlightening to all His creations. Christianity is therefore not Platonism for the people. It is the salvation of the philosophers, saved from their own inability to explain origins. How can any will to power be separated from some one who wills it?

    Against Foucault, Augustine warns that the desire to know is “more dangerous” than sensual temptation—”of making experiments with the help of the body” (X. xxxv. 175). Foucault therefore in a way does not love too dangerously but not dangerously enough. To attempt to combine the desire to know with sensual experiment would misdirect mind and body alike, ending in un-creating wordlessness. The better course is, “Be angry and sin not”—angry at one’s self for its clottishness (IX. iv. 21).

    A genuine liberal education would aim at—or, more modestly, keep before it—the angelic ideal. Angels read not books but the face of God. Angels “always behold thy face.” “They read, they choose, they love. They are ever reading; and that never passes away which they read; because by choosing and by loving, they read the very unchangeableness of thy counsel.” (XIII. xv. 407) As for Christians, they should follow a special form of the Biblical injunction to increase and multiply: They should spread the Word as preserved in the Book of books. For man, believing is seeing (after hearing); for God, seeing and speaking is creating.

    It is very difficult for a philosopher to convert to Biblical religion. Intellect, reasoning, aim at principles, even as the senses aim at empirical substances. A Biblical orientation elevates the dialogical or ‘political’ element of Platonic philosophy to a ‘metaphysical’ level. Dialogue becomes a meta-cosmic condition, but it is not a dialogue among equals—even less than a Socratic dialogue is a dialogue among equals. Although not political in Aristotle’s distinctive sense—as the dialogue between God and man more resembles fatherly rule than it does the reciprocity of ruling and being ruled between husbands and wives or among fellow-citizens—it is political in the more capacious sense of personal rule, including rule by God via His laws. In this, philosophy retains a place, as a handmaiden, because creation also means separation; in Christianity if not in Judaism you do have nature, if in a weaker sense than in ‘the ancients,’ many of whom supposed nature to be eternal. (In saying the personal is the political, modern feminism follows Christianity. But by focusing politics narrowly on human ‘power relations’ its atheism deprives it of Christian metaphysics and classical rationalism. Indeed, its irrationalism tends to give feminism its secular-fanatic air, its ‘German’ tendency to conflate the least lovely elements of philosophy and Biblicism.)

    The Confessions shows the difficulty philosophers and ‘intellectuals’ more generally have in converting, reorienting their souls, away from nature, from principles, and toward personhood as a metaphysical truth.

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    An American Orthodoxy?

    February 26, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Damascene Christensen: Not of This World: The Life and Teachings of Fr. Seraphim Rose. Forestville, CA.: Fr. Seraphim Rose Foundation, 1995.

     

    Note: Father Seraphim Rose (1934-1982) was a convert to Russian Orthodox Christianity. Born Eugene Rose in San Diego, California, he entered the Orthodox Church in 1962, eventually living a life of strict asceticism modeled on Eastern monastic way of life. He was a prolific author, translator, and publisher, and above all Christian witness until his untimely death.

     

    “The City of God is captive and stranger in the earthly city.”
    –St. Augustine

    Augustine means that the City of God is persecuted on earth, by the earthly. But he also and equally means, the City of God is here. Not of course in the fullest sense of its re-founding, an event that awaits the return of Jesus Christ and finally the creation of a new heaven and a new earth, ruled by Him. Rather, the City of God is here insofar as the Holy Spirit recruits citizens who live on earth now, and will never be silenced. Christians are not of this world because they fear God as ruler more than they fear any man or group of men as rulers; their hope rests in God, even as they cherish unworldly hopes for man.

    What do the Christian fear and the Christian hope mean in the United States of America? Father Seraphim Rose never stopped raising this question. Through his life and the example he left, he built the foundation of an answer with the living materials of Scriptural doctrine. In defending St. Augustine against detractors within the Church, Father Seraphim defended nothing less than his own experience, his own living witness, as “captive and stranger” in his own earthly city.

    Long before knowing what he needed, Eugene Rose knew what he did not need, or want. He did not need the America of his place and time: California in the 1950s, the drive by, drive-in way of life. Looking back, some might mistake the place for a paradise during a time of innocence. There is pleasure in rootlessness. ‘Fifties California might be described as ‘Lockeland’ with beaches, a place in which the life of comfortable self-preservation commended by the English philosopher needed little of the sober and industrious habits of mind and heart Locke judged necessary and commendable. This laid-back Lockeland had a religion of sorts, and Eugene Rose called it by its right name: “comfortable Christianity.” Comfortable Christianity’s faithful went to church Sunday morning while looking forward to the real highlight of the week, football. Comfortable Christianity prefers compassion to charity, eros to agape; it goes along to get along.

    Eugene Rose was born in but not of this bourgeois world. He was well-named. ‘Eugene’ means well-born, and this young man was what Thomas Jefferson called a natural aristocrat. A natural aristocrat’s soul wants not pleasure and comfort but honor and victory. It is spirited, not erotic. Depending on the direction it takes, it may despise the weak or defend them; either way, it will not rest satisfied with weakness. At every one of his way-stations to the Cross, Eugene Rose enacted his aristocratic, spirited nature: first Spinoza, disciple of Machiavelli, that derider of effete Christianity; then Nietzsche, the manly and eloquent ‘Anti-Christ,’ condemning Pauline Christianity with the ferocity of Luther attacking the Papacy. Eugene Rose later saw that real atheism is both spiritual and spirited—a passionate wrestling with the angel of God. Music, too, is the sound of passion, of a spiritedness that wants to leap beyond this world, that hates finitude, loves liberty; and he loved music. Even his heavy drinking at this time fit the portrait; I never knew a serious drinker who didn’t have a chip on his shoulder. Self-destructive rage is as spiritual and as spirited as determined atheism and the impassioned love of music; such rage is a critique of the self, a symptom of dissatisfaction of the earthly city. From the first Eugene was, as his biographer tells us, “a warrior of the mind and spirit.”

    The soul of the spirited man cannot sustain itself on spiritedness alone. Hitler went from conquest to mass murder to suicide. Nietzsche’s soul descended to madness. the soul of Alan Watts, Eugene Rose’s teacher, descended to slack eroticism, enabling his student to see through the hypocrisy of the ‘Sixties—that bizarre pose of high moralism covering soft self-indulgence—before the ‘Sixties began. His own hedonism was characteristically spirited: unsatisfied and unsatisfiable, resulting in a sort of Hell-on-earth or demonic possession. When he saw that spiritedness and spirituality can degrade as well as ennoble, Eugene Rose became ripe for the sanity of Orthodox Christianity.

    But not immediately. He did not want to be his father, a kind, well-meaning man, a Christian man, but lacking his son’s fire. Frank Rose was an American democrat, the sort of man Tocqueville describes as tyrannized by public opinion, Nietzsche’s “Last Man,” who has replaced the morning prayer with the morning newspaper, a man who says, above all else, ‘Please do not hurt me.’ Frank Rose was not a bad man. He was a kindly, sympathetic man. But neither was he a strong man, a ‘man’s man,’ as people said in those days. Not the sanity of Orthodox Christianity but the sanity of Chinese tradition, the down-to-earth sobriety of the Tao and Confucius, attracted Eugene Rose before Orthodoxy did. “The end of learning is to be a good man, he teacher Alan Watts told him; “respect is the regulating force of love.” Aristocratic, yes: but the wisdom of China was not enough for Eugene Rose. The real answer to a spirited soul must be a personal God, whom China does not recognize. (Watt’s “Impersonal Self” is a flat contradiction in terms.) Only a personal God can care, can accept honor, can show favor by His Providence. To this God, to the God of the Bible as found in the living tradition of the Orthodox Church, Eugene Rose finally turned.

    How to be an Orthodox Christian in Lockeland-by-the-Beach? America, let alone California, has no long tradition of Orthodoxy, as Russia does. A false ecumenism along the lines of the World Council of Churches—really the Worldly Council of Churches—could never satisfy a manly (or womanly) Christian. As monks recently ordained in the Russian Orthodox Church, Eugene Rose and his Russian émigré friend, Gleb Podmoshensky, set sail on an ocean that was anything but pacific.

    Taking the Russianness of Russian Orthodoxy most seriously, they revered czarism, hearkening to the words of a Russian who warned that “a government must rule by the Grace of God or the will of the people.” They perhaps did not recall that this was precisely Lincoln’s point when he confronted Stephen Douglas’s argument for ‘popular sovereignty’ in the 1850s. Lincoln knew (having learned it from reading Jefferson) that popular sovereignty must itself be governed by “the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” or it can excuse slavery or any other evil—”blow out the moral lights around us,” as Lincoln said. Vox populi is not vox Dei. Neither Eugene Rose nor Gleb Podmoshensky had a teacher on America, which by their time and in their place had wandered far from its best principles, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. And so they had to find their way slowly, according to the Spirit of God, not the ‘spirit of the times.’

    They did find their way. His friend saw the beginning of an answer: The earthly city is here, but so is the City of God. The City of God is not so much to be founded (although it is to be re-founded and perfected). It has already been founded by the Prince of Peace, the Archegos or Founder. This spiritual city, this spiritual regime, maybe be easier to rediscover at a distance from the secular cities; hence their move to the fruitful ‘desert’ of the California forest, and their cultivation their of “the desert ideal.” In so moving, the two men faced their most dangerous challenge not from indifferent, indulgent America but from their own archbishop. Once again, Gleb Podmoshensky proved to be at least as ‘American’ as his friend: The archbishop “wants to take your own piece of American earth, for which you labored, in order to kick you off it!” What you earn by your labor is yours. So spoke Locke, so spoke Jefferson, so spoke Lincoln; so spoke a Russian émigré who knew why he wanted to be in America. The archbishop wanted these spiritual brothers to be dependent upon himself, rather as George III wanted to bring the American colonists to heel. He wanted to compel obedience for the ostensible good of the souls of these young monks. (Similarly, the divine right of kings, asserted by the English, was very far from a despicable doctrine; it was intended as a framework for Christian peacemaking, as Robert Filmer makes clear in his Patriarchia. The problem remains the same, however: Where do wholesome obedience and due humility end, servility and cowardice begin?) In modern terms, the ethos of the archbishop is the ethos of bureaucracy, the dream of the false elder who, in the words of I. M. Kontzevich, “eclipses God by means of himself.”

    The brothers did the American, as well as the Christian thing. They declared their independence. There are no ‘masters’ and ‘slaves’ in the Church. The master/slave dialectic is Hegelian and Marxist, not Christian. “To meekly bow down to tyranny, most especially when this tyranny only destroys a God-pleasing work and extinguishes the Christian and monastic spirit in its victims—is certainly only a parody and mockery of Orthodoxy and monasticism,” Brother Eugene remarked, in the spirit of God and with the spiritedness of the Continental Congress of 1776. “The canons were made for man and not man for the canons”; “above the canons is the spirit that inspired them,” namely, the spirit of the Creator-God, and of His laws and the laws He put into nature. Above the United States Constitution, Lincoln said, is the Declaration of Independence, affirming the self-evident, God-endowed rights of every human being.

    The author of the Declaration of Independence was no Christian, although many of those who signed his declaration were. The Declaration is deliberately crafted to form the foundation of a political alliance between religious and secular men. As such, it can be overbalanced fatally in the direction of secularism, whether of a vox populi that commands as if it were the vox Dei, or of a bureaucracy seeking to instantiate Hegel’s ‘Absolute Spirit,’ which is anything but holy. It took Lincoln to see the spiritual dimension of the American regime. Democracy, Lincoln said, was the desire to be neither master nor slave, but a self-governing citizen under God. The United States Constitution, the letter of the law, is not enough. Only a rededication of Americans to the principles of the Declaration could renew the spirit of the law, bringing “a new birth of freedom.” Brother Eugene and Brother Gleb asked, If monasticism is not for the salvation of souls, then what is it for? Lincoln asked, If America is not for self-government in accordance with the laws of Nature and of Nature’s God, then what is it for?

    And what is asceticism, if not a declaration of independence from the world, the flesh, and the devil? For Brother Eugene, rechristened Father Seraphim, self-government was the chance for victory in the spiritual warfare, in which war he enlisted in the army of God. Whatever they may say, tyrants never enlist in the army of God. Stalin asked Churchill, sneeringly: “How many divisions has the Pope?” Churchill repeated the question to Pius XII, who rejoined, “Tell my son Joseph he shall meet my divisions in eternity.” To Pius XII, Father Seraphim might have replied, “Those divisions are not yours, but God’s. It is for us to soldier on, not to command.” This suggests that in declaring one’s independence from the earthly city, one must not only assert oneself. Nor must one only assert God’s law. One must also repent. Every declaration of independence is also and more importantly a declaration of dependence. Self-government is not autonomy. Self-government is aligning one’s soul with God’s government, to “acquire the mind” of the Holy Fathers, while recognizing that we will not soon live up to God’s government. The warning of St. Theophan the Recluse should resound in the ears of every American Christian: When royal government falls, self-government emerges. If it this is nothing more than government of, by, and for the self, the government of humans who imagine themselves self-sufficient, self-government will fail. There is no such thing as self-government in this sense. There is only government by God or by Satan. The City of God is captive and stranger here, not of the earth but still very much down-to-earth. Only in this living experience of Christianity here can a genuinely American Orthodoxy be built and sustained.

    At their next step, it was Father Seraphim, even more than Father Herman, who saw what needed to be done. Life in a commercial republic bustles rather than meditates. Constancy or fidelity finds little encouragement in a society forever in motion. But only he who endures to the end will be saved. How to find constancy in such turmoil. Through work. Down-to-earth, practical work, not meditative navel-gazing, much less chiliastic utopia-building, is the antidote to powerful distractions of the commercial republic, precisely because work is what commercial republicans do and respect. The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak? Very well then: strengthen both spirit and flesh by working. Strengthening the flesh is good, if the spirit governs the flesh. Work with all due care, following Bishop Nektary’s injunction not to spill the grace of God. Work intelligently. Add the prudence of serpents to the innocence of doves. Or, as Father Seraphim put it, “We must follow the advice of St. Basil and begin to learn to take from the world around us where there is wisdom, and where there is foolishness to know why it is foolishness.” This is much more than ‘Yankee ingenuity,’ but can take hold in America because it builds on Yankee ingenuity.

    Self-government is local government. “To practice love, trust, and life according to the Holy Fathers in the small circle where one is,” and not to cherish grand national or ‘world-historical’ ambitions: Father Seraphim saw, with Tolstoy, that the Kingdom of God is within you, but he did not mean this is Tolstoy’s Rousseauistic sense. Say it, rather, as a question: Is the Kingdom of God, the City of God, the Regime of God, within me? “The original Catacomb Church was not an organization at all, but a gathering in oneness of soul,” Damascene Christensen writes; it is citizenship in the City of God. We strive to be good citizens while knowing we will not be perfect citizens in this life, and with equanimity refusing to expect perfection in our neighbors. Such an expectation would be neither loving nor neighborly, and will lead to disunion, to civil war.

    Local self-government requires the right education of the young, so that they may become fellow-citizens. “From infancy,” Father Seraphim writes, “today’s child is treated, as a rule, like a little god or goddess.” As Dostoevsky saw, such treatment ends not in godliness but in Raskolnikov, the son of the most misguided mother in Christian literature. Self-esteem—the obsession of the demi-educated of today—for Christians can only mean esteem for your true soul, as created by God. Inasmuch as every human soul is flawed by sinfulness, this means that true self-esteem is esteem for someone we are not, an undefiled being created in God’s image, or what Lincoln called, thinking not of any individual but his nation, “the better angels of our nature.” True self-esteem is not self-worship but God-worship, loving God and loving neighbor as oneself, as a creation of God. This is difficult but not impossible. The next time you are in a waiting room or on a bus, look at the people around you, at your fellow Americans, and conceive of them as souls. Then you are on the path to loving them. Abraham Lincoln had ‘the kind of face only a mother could love.’ But his soul—that was another matter.

    In considering the life of Father Seraphim Rose, American Christians will find a captive, a stranger, a friend and fellow-citizen. They will find themselves. Perhaps American of many faiths will also find him, as they found in Lincoln, a soul who calls them to themselves? And therefore to their Creator, the endower of their unalienable rights. This is the true “new birth of freedom.”

    Filed Under: Bible Notes

    Montesquieu’s Erotic Liberalism

    February 26, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Diana J. Schaub: Erotic Liberalism: Women and Revolution in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters. Lanaham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

    Originally published in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy. Volume 24, Number 1. Republished with permission.

     

    “Sex is a theme hardly mentioned in the thought underlying the American founding,” the late Allan Bloom complained. [1] America is ‘Lockeland,’ and John Locke was not a notably sexy man. The education of his young gentleman includes no hearty recommendation of a jaunt to Paris. Preservation, not procreation; fear, not love; a leveling shove to a deadening common denominator where men and women remain upright with both feet fully on the ground: these features comprise the Lockean heritage in America for Bloom, who could not bring himself to love it. America’s gallant defender might point to Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Maria Cosway, or to the gleam in Ben Franklin’s eye; or even to the startling pace at which Americans populated most of a continent in the decades subsequent to the founding; the defender might deny that America is ‘Lockeland.’ The larger question remains: Can modern liberalism, so considerably shaped by Locke, Smith, Bentham, Mill, challenged and supplemented by a phalanx of stern and dutiful Germans beginning with Kant, all issuing in the decidedly unerotic consummation that is John Rawls—can this liberalism account for eros in any way superior to Darwinian population studies or some other low Victorianism?

    But then there are the French. They, too, have their bores, the ones who want to ideologize sexuality in some misguided imitation of German system-building (Jean-Paul de Beauvoir, the grim Foucault), or mechanize it, in a misapplication of Newtonian mechanics (Voltaire, the philosophes generally). Still, liberalism is also Montaigne, Montesquieu, Tocqueville.

    Montesquieu is among the sanest of the moderns, one who never lets one nation, or one obsession, dominate his thought. The first thing he does, when he wants to write of France, is to introduce his readers to Persia. Two Persians have lived in his home, he tells us. This was an opportunity for him to learn, because persons transplanted from distant lands “no longer have any secrets” (The Persian Letters, Preface). They regard their host as so foreign that they have no need for the usual social caution, the white lies and dark concealments, that society invites and compels its members to make. Secrets are the obverse of the public, social bonds; secrets assert liberty and bespeak vulnerability. The Enlightenment would make what had been secret public, in the names of equality and liberty. Montesquieu contributed to a great Enlightenment project, the Encyclopédie, but with his own pointed correction. He contributed an article on “taste,” which he knew the project needed, rather than the articles on despotism and liberty which the editor had supposed it needed.

    That telling anecdote is one of many brought to light by Diana J. Schaub in Erotic Liberalism. She brings to her task a mind well matched to her subject: stocked with useful learning; sensitive to details, but with a strength that never lingers too long on the surface; not unfamiliar with the uses of both secrecy and display, indirection and flourish. The Persian Letters has found a reader of esprit.

    In Montesquieu she finds “a liberalism responsive to circumstances, history, and national differences, while avoiding the perils of relativism and historicism” (Erotic Liberalism, xii). A genuinely erotic liberalism would never love humanity but hate people, as some philosophes were wont to do. Sexuality reminds of the particular even as a universal trait. Montesquieu writes on subjects much in vogue now: diversity, sexuality and ‘sexual politics,’ the multiplicity of cultures. But he never gets lost in mere différence, nor allows his readers to give themselves over to self-righteous thumotic passions. Schaub shows herself to be alert to the political atmosphere of her own times, using the ‘Montesquieu our contemporary’ motif to invite, charm, attract those readers now marching to the brassy notes of the regnant conform-anarchism. Like her man, she wants her readers not only to read but to think. Thinking imperils orthodoxies; Schaub is a very subversive writer. At the same time, and just as pertinently, she shows how critic of current orthodoxies might proceed in a manner less direct, less overtly challenging, less ‘masculine’ and gadfly-like than that of Bloom—in a more serpentine and indeed Lockean manner. In this she has recent precursors, Mary P. Nichols and Catherine H. Zuckert. Against intellectual tyrants with powerful foreign regimes behind them, some combination of Socratism and Churchillian statesmanship makes sense. Against the high priests and priestesses of egalitarianism, backed not by armies but by a deus semi-absconditus called modern bureaucracy, a less manly approach may in the end prove more effective—at least in some circumstances and in some respects, as Montesquieu would not hesitate to add. Strategically, we are all Gramscians now.

    Montesquieu, Schaub writes, carefully distanced himself from “the younger philosophes” and their “polemicization of philosophy” (EL, p. 8). Such polemicization, she invites readers to see, can only defeat the tolerance that ‘multiculturalism’ seeks to encourage. “The prosecutorial method”—shared by thumotic personalities always and everywhere—”may not be the best way to ascertain Montesquieu’s intention” (EL, p. 8), or indeed the best way to open anyone’s mind, including one’s own.

    Politically, the “erotic foundation” of Montesquieu’s liberalism affords a place for the building blocks of the polity, family and property, both “rooted in a particular disposition of sexual passion” (EL, p. 9). “Montesquieu’s poetry may be in the service of the bourgeoisie,” the class that gives modern politics its energy and stability, “in a way that Rousseau’s does not” (EL, p. 9). This is nonetheless every bit a form of modern poetry; the epistolary novel is “a new vehicle for the new philosophy,” one that organizes the drama less around arguments (and, by implication, reason) than the dialogue forms does, and more (though not exclusively) around the passions of the characters and of the reader. Montesquieu rejects the supposed Platonic notion that ideas are “positive things” (“Essay on Taste,” quoted in EL, p. 161, n. 41). He is anti-‘abstraction,’ more ‘bodily,’ concerned with the “feminization of philosophy” (EL, p. 11) for the new, predominantly female audience of novel-readers. The Montesquieuian political philosopher rejects the ‘masculine’ approaches to “the philosopher’s relationship to the political community” (EL, p. 11), whether Platonic (the ideas, the triumph in speech over the city’s destruction of Socrates’ body) or Machiavellian (the entirely non-abstract, but regrettably tyrannical ambition to master the woman, Fortuna).

    An epistolary novel is as dramatic as a dialogue, as much an imitation of conflict. Contradiction first requires separation, and the Persian Letters is nothing if not a study of separation—of the separation of self-exiled Persians from their country, of the Persian Usbek from his wives, of Usbek’s Enlightenment head from his possessive heart, and even the philosophic part of his head from the social-emulative-political part of his head. Not only does Usbek’s professed reason for leaving Persia, “a desire for knowledge” (PL, no. 1), contradict his more physical and political reason, the need to evade his enemies, but the very word he uses for “desire,” “l’envie,” may hint that his desire is not pure eros for knowledge as such, but mixed with a certain concern for social status. Too, there is the separation of the creator from the created, in this sense, the disappeared god, Usbek, from the eunuchs he has created (PL, no. 2) and from the women the eunuchs are to guard. Why should a genuine creator-god need to seek knowledge? This deus absconditus has not merely disappeared; he does not really exist as a god, at all. As the sixty-fourth letter shows, the priests secretly rule ‘god,’ that is, they rule in place of a god who effectually does not exist. The Persian Letters deserves its reputation as a masterpiece of atheism, an attack on “the claim common to the three great revealed religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam” (EL, p. 17). “Montesquieu’s overarching purpose in the Persian Letters is to disorient—to dis-Orient Christianity, France, and the patriarchal family” (EL, p. 17), to  get them away from the ‘Oriental’ ethos of absolutist monarchy, of despotism, and of an abstracted but still commanding god (whose priests are ventriloquists), and to reconnect human beings to nature.

    To do so, Schaub observes, Montesquieu understands just as acutely as Hegel that philosophy can no longer begin with nature, or with political conventions that are so simple that they still reflect nature, as they did in antiquity. Philosophy must begin “amidst human history and human convention” (EL, p. 20). Hence Montesquieu’s reputation as the father of sociology. Political liberty at best will still be a somewhat looser, more comfortable unfreedom, because men are fish caught in nets made up of laws that either chafe irritatingly (despotism) or give them sufficient room to ignore their capture. Despotism is a certain pattern of law-nets, not so much a reflectionof the tyrannical soul, a natural soul perverted, as seen by the ancients. Despotism is a net woven from the fabric of doctrines, not of soul-types. It is woven of such doctrines as Biblical religion and Hobbesian natural right. These doctrines share an appeal to fear, whether fear of God as the beginning of wisdom or fear of violent death, threatened by the ‘absolute’ monarch who settles all controversies in order to impose a peace that precisely and pointedly does not pass all understanding (or even the meanest understanding).

    Why not a renewal and adaptation of that estimable moderate, Aristotle, then? Montesquieu remains a modern, a man of impassioned individuality. Moderation and prudence are recoverable (perhaps the better word is ‘simulated’) “not on the grounds of classical virtue but on the grounds of security and liberty for the individual” (EL, p. 25). This is moderation ‘from below’—from the passions—not ‘from above’—from a reason that rules through thumos. (Usbek’s Enlightenment rationalism is impotent as it attempts to rule the passionate wives by means of the thumotic eunuchs; Montesquieu satirizes Plato’s tripartite regime of philosopher-kings in this, as well as his claim that reason can rule the passions by allying itself with thumos within the human soul.) The fundamental human passions are capable of such ‘moderate’ or tamed expression because they are not thumotic. Unlike absolute-monarchist Hobbes’s war of all against all, Montesquieu’s state of nature is peaceful. Men are naturally timid and needful. “The prayers of natural man are directed not to God but to natural woman” (EL,p. 26); it is not clear to whom natural woman prays, or if she does. Warlike passions arise in Persia or in Paris, in fear-based despotism or honor-bound monarchy-aristocracy. Warlike men do not pray to women; they seize and incarcerate them in harems or nunneries of various sorts. The harem, the regime of castration of guardian-eunuchs and claustration of women-possessions shows “most starkly the results of an attempt to realize virtue in the face of natural opposition” (EL, p. 38). Schaub pauses to remind readers that “Montesquieu turns individuals away from such life-denying ethics as ancient manliness and Christian martyrdom, but not, like Hobbes, by directly advocating cowardice. An at least residual admiration for human high-heartedness may be quite indispensable to political life” (EL, p. 39). The wives at last rebel, openly, after years of discreet rebellion.

    In sum: Socrates the manly, the gadfly, yes. But also Socrates the midwife, who “swears by Hera rather than by Zeus,” anthropos rather than aner, human rather than manly (EL, p. 42). Still, Montesquieu’s Socratism goes only so far. Montesquieu’s woman-oracle is Roxane, who speaks of her desires and the laws of nature, the passions, not Diotima, who “speaks of eros and immortality” (EL, p. 43). The ruling passions of the noblest Montesquieian minds aim at bodily pleasures, although not bodily pleasures basely understood. “[N]ature is body, not the sunlight of truth” to be seen outside the cave (EL p. 47). And—one hopes the ghost or esprit of Foucault listens—such pleasures are ruined by the introduction of despotic power-politics into the harem by the excessively manly Usbek. This brings out counter-despotic thumos in the women (they are not “entirely creatures of the body,” Schaub notes [EL, p. 54]) and defeats the purpose of the family, which is procreation and the rearing of progeny. “Under the dynamic of despotic jealousy, Usbek gives no thought to either the continuance of life or the commodiousness of life” (EL, p. 53). In Europe, this critique of infecundity would result in the liberalization of divorce laws, and far less frequent recourse to the cloister and the monastery. In this, English Protestantism is wiser than French Catholicism, producing Jane Austen heroines instead of Eloise or Emma Bovary. Tyranny (and here Schaub says tyranny, not despotism) of fathers heavenly and earthly—the separation of men from women, the possession of other property by central state and central church, insufficiently separated—yields population decline, the prevention of life by celibacy and the destruction of life by unnecessary poverty and wars. (Whispered to feminists: abortion is no more to be encouraged, for the same reason [EL, pp. 67-68]).

    To say it another way, Montesquieu is a philosopher of esprit. He commits a sin against the Holy Spirit by making Him an ‘it’ and identifying it with the proselytizing spirit, thus the imperial spirit, thus the attempt to conquer nature. Nature returns to break the priestly pitchfork by revolutionizing the despotic, ‘Oriental’ regimes, animated by the ‘spirits’ of the Bible and the Koran. But note: Satan’s pitchfork will also break. Machiavelli’s militant, proselytizing, imperialist atheism, to say nothing of the Hegelian spirit to come, with its insane tyrannical deformations ‘Left’ and ‘Right,’ will fail for the reason Charles de Gaulle identified: They are unnatural, unattractive, finally impossible to maintain. De Gaulle thought of the statesman not as a conqueror but as a farmer. Montesquieu, Shaub recalls, made his living from vineyards—a sort of farming that suggests the symposium of philosophy more than sober statesmanship, but farming nonetheless. Montesquieu’s moderated Machiavellianism entails, among other things, an atheism that does not contradict itself by deifying itself. It does not fall victim to the disease Schaub calls impotence tyrannus. Just as eunuchs are alienated from the generative part of their own nature (and as monks are so alienated by their celibacy, anticipated in much milder form by the Jewish practice of circumcision [EL, p. 79]), rechanneling their desires to domination, so the despot alienates himself from his own nature as a man even as he strives thumotically for ‘manly’ dominance. The power-man is the man of impotence; the jealousy of the jealous god or husband is really impotence, ungodliness, unmanliness. With a perhaps too-cruel pun, Schaub writes, “Usbek cuts rather a sad figure” (EL, p. 88). Enlightenment alone will not do.

    Fecundity results in wealth and variety. “The importance Montesquieu attaches to the need for variety cannot be underestimated” (EL, p. 98). There is one bad regime, despotism, but many good regimes, in the many circumstances in which human beings live. The non-holy esprit of Montesquieu is “the spirit of laws and the general spirit of nations” (EL, p. 98). Again, one might note the contrast with the Bible, where the chosen nation [and later, the individuals chosen by the Holy Spirit] is separated from the mere nations, the gentiles.) Esprit is “a capacious word” meaning with and wisdom, spiritedness and mind; the human at its best (EL, p. 98. Montesquieu’s other Persian, Rica the one who readily adopts to things Parisian, tells the story of a philosopher-queen who refounds the regime of a despotic husband in the spirit of “spiritedness in defense of political liberty” (EL, p. 103), the regime of variety. Such stories are satirical, but this is a satire of a non-Juvenalian kind, inviting readers to smile at themselves. “Ridicule becomes a goad to self-examination, rather than an instrument of scorn and separation” (EL, p. 103), too easily an instrument of despotic narrowing of the range of human possibility. In another enlightening story, one of Montesquieu’s writers has recourse to the original religion of Persia, Zoroastrianism, a natural religion “in which the sacred law affirms the inclination of nature” (EL, p. 105), including marriage of equal partners and, not incidentally, the fecundity of commerce. Nature brings persons and things together, unlike the ‘founding separation’ seen in both Biblical creationism and classical philosophy, with its ascent from the cave and its talk of idea. These myths, Montesquieu implies, are dangerous, as is entropic Hobbesian physics. Montesquieu’s “dis-Orienting” is a remixing; nature mixes, blurs, presents distinctions whose edges are not clear cut. Story-themes of incest and androgyny, cross-cultural fertilization, and procreative sex, of commerce in the most comprehensive as well as the usual sense of the word, all convey this claim. Republicanism is part of it: Rica writes to Usbek that fear, the foundation of despotism, has only one language, whereas nature is multiform. This conception of nature is a ‘feminine’ insight. Rica, though a young man, has a woman’s name (EL, p. 113); he is receptive, not dominating, and one wonders if his mother, who misses him and accuses Usbek of stealing him (PL, no.8), suspects that her son has been made Usbek’s catamite. At any rate, “Despotism, it seems, exaggerates or absolutizes sexual differentiation; liberty, by its encouragement of individuality, erodes it. The facts of nature doubtless remain, but their social bearing is far from ossified” (EL, p. 119). Eros takes different shapes in different regimes. Under despotism, where women are objects of luxurious accumulation, eros is pleasure, that is, a kind of selfishness that separates while coupling. Under despotism, not only fear but eroticism itself divides men so as to make them conquerable. In republics, with their reciprocity or commerce, and their taste in literature for the pastoral romance (seen in Hellenistic Greece, Renaissance Italy, and England), eros is love. In monarchies, where women rule behind the scenes as orderers of luxury, eros is gallantry. Montesquieu’s France moves toward republicanism from its current combination of monarchy and despotism; this may be seen in its taste for badinage, boudoir talk in public, “the opening up of the private to the public” (EL, p. 119). (The use of this practice in today’s commercial republican regimes may be seen on television; philosophers who would understand contemporary America may start their day with breakfast with Regis and Kathie Lee and their embourgeoisement of badinage.) “Women are consummate consumers” (EL,p. 121); to please their consuming women, aristocrats must learn to work for a living, and thereby step toward a new regime, leaving warlike pride or machismo (Greek thumos or Machiavellian virtù) for productive pride or vanity. “[P]erhaps France is salvageable,” even if Persia is not (EL, p. 135).

    “Vanity is a kind of socialized fear—not the natural, dissociative, Hobbesian fear that culminates in despotism, but a man-made, communicative, opinion-based fear that renders human beings interdependent” (EL, p. 136). Nature fluctuates as water can; the attempt to restrict it too rigidly, too despotically, leads to broken dikes and dams. Respect it, and it can become tamer, rechanneled into, and by, formal institutions that will not break. Commercial republicanism and despotism both rely on the passions, but commercial republicanism does so intelligently, effectively. Liberty replaces virtue. Virtuous republicanism self-destructs because a regime founded upon public opinion cannot at the same time adhere consistently to virtue conceived as self-renunciation (a problem unseen, one might note, by such American progressives as Woodrow Wilson). Commerce will satisfy human passions, pacifying as well as stimulating them. One of Montesquieu’s more attractive characters lives in Venice, the commercial republic that governs water liberally. “[I]t is commerce not religion”—variety, not oneness—”that effectively inspires good faith,” by observing contracts among men “rather than the covenant with God” (EL, p. 140).

    As in his politics, so in his writings: “The disjointed and open-ended quality of Montesquieu’s writing is a call to self-government,” to his reader’s reasoning capacities,to the ability to make sense of the writer’s complex universe (EL, p. 145). Montesquieu is not a deus absconditus; he is present in every line he writes. But, like nature, he wants to intermingle with his readers. “In Hobbes, reason panders basely to the passions; in Montesquieu, passion is the divine consort of reason,” the most perfect, the noblest, the most exquisite of the senses (EL, p. 144).

    Perhaps any liberalism based upon Enlightenment, the bringing of reason to the many, requires eros of some sort, not only because it involves liberty conceived as the liberation of the passions, but because reason is itself erotic, desirous. A philosopher who wants only an Enlightened despot may take nature, and human nature, as entropic; human beings are atoms, colliding, separating fearfully, made to cohere by the one man who artfully and forcefully consolidates them, who pulls the net tight. But if nature is erotic, or at least more erotic than entropic, the net can be looser. Montesquieu evidently differs from Plato not so much in his eroticism but on the issue of sensuality or materialism. Materialism appears to lend a more egalitarian cast to his thought; the despotic materialists of this century unwisely tried to mix thumos with their materialism, spawning ‘leaders’ who dreamt of master races and vanguard classes. The newer, post-‘totalitarian’ ideologues commit the same error, incoherently wanting uniformity of opinion amidst diversity of ‘cultures,’ bodies, and bodily combinations. Can the pharmakon of Montesquieu cure them of their illusions, enlighten them?

    Taken by itself, the Persian Letters cannot. It is not clear how erotic liberalism could defend itself, except over the very long run, and then only intermittently. Perhaps that is all Montesquieu hopes for. But perhaps not: He went on to write The Spirit of the Laws. As the writer of letter 86 suggests, law can settle the very thumotic disputes that disappointed love provokes. True law is the law of reason, and must be administered by the few who are reasonable. The few who are reasonable and who administer the law are judges. They are an anomaly within the commercial republic (unless they are bad judges of the sort who ‘follow the election returns’). Nonetheless, a commercial republic needs more than good laws and wise judges. It needs, in terms Montesquieu uses, executive dispatch and resolve. This involves thumos. De Gaulle and others have seen that commercial republicanism needs more than a moderated Machiavellianism to defend it. There is a need for thumotic republicanism, too, in some complex mixture with the erotic kind.

     

    Endnote

    1. Allan Bloom: The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 187.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

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