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    Archives for January 2018

    Socrates in the City

    January 8, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Mary P. Nichols: Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.

    Originally published in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy. Vol.ume 17, Number 2, Winter 1989-90.

     

    If the name ‘Socrates’ means ‘rule of wisdom,’ small wonder Athenians finally put him to death. That he survived so long attests to his failure to put anything in writing. That his memory survives, however, attests to the writing of others, who portrayed him as the archetypal philosopher, the one whose way of life raised the question of philosophy’s relation to the polis. Theories may or may not directly affect political life, but theorizing does. If you make people think, they will not act while they are thinking; after they finish (if they do) they may act differently than before. Good citizens have known to find this infuriating.

    Nichols’ book has three main parts: on Aristophanes’ Clouds, on Plato’s Republic, and on the second book of Aristotle’s Politics. Although many might believe these books thoroughly discussed by others, Nichols has other ideas. Fortunately, she is right, and the conflicts between some of her interpretations and those of Allan Bloom, Leo Strauss, and Paul Friedlander may do her readers the favor of returning them to the original text with renewed eyes.

    Nichols’ careful reading of the Clouds does not entirely diverge from Strauss’ account in Socrates and Aristophanes. Their emphases differ. She is more down-to-earth about clouds: “Whereas Strauss’ Aristophanes considers “the old-fashioned… no less laughable, no less unreasonable, than the newfangled,” Nichols more measuredly calls Aristophanes “a conservative who sees the limitations of what he is trying to conserve.” She never suggests that Aristophanes wants to be a god. She regards the Just Speech hypocritical but not mistaken in his words. Rather, she describes the Unjust Speech, Socrates, and Phidippides (Strepsiades’ son)as erroneously imagining nature to be “composed of absolutes, unrelated to [other] things in nature, and uninfluenced by time.” The attempt to bring convention into line with this misconceived nature yields young men fit for no action except father-beating. Nor are they fit for thought, and here she comes close to Strauss:

    “Seeking the universal or the unlimited [she writes], Socrates turns to nonhuman nature and to man only insofar as he resembles nonhuman nature. Socrates loses sight of the human, aware only of the movements of matter…. Socrates, seeking freedom in universality, discovers only that man is a slave to his own body. Caught in contradiction, Socrates is laughable.”

    Nichols finds Aristophanes convincing up to a point, but she sees the limitations of his conservatism. A clever defense of ordinary life, of normalcy, cannot account for the fact that “it is in ordinary life that the desire for completeness,” including philosophic eros, “arises.” “How long can laughter check desire and prevent tears?” With this question she turns to the Republic.

    This interpretation forms the bulk and the core of the book. Here Nichols takes issue with Strauss and especially with Bloom on the significance of the philosopher-kings. She argues that they represent the culmination of a profoundly un-Socratic argument led by Socrates but energized by Glaucon’s desire for perfection,” a desire that is not so much erotic as spirited. Whereas Bloom contends that the spirited man endangers himself and others because his love of his own closes his mind to reason, Nichols contends that both love of one’s own and philosophy can bring the illusion of independence from the city, if they are ill-mixed. The philosopher-kings exemplify this. They are finally creatures of the city—orthodox, un-Socratic, unquestioning. They attract Glaucon, who “does not pursue knowledge so much as the certainty knowledge affords.” “Ultimately, the city offers knowledge of simple and eternal ideas as a substitute for the uncertain understanding necessary in a world of complex and changing objects.” Philosophy does not lead men to the unnatural unity of communism; politics does, in its anti-erotic quest for changeless order and control. Reason is reduced to a merely disciplinary force that serves the ‘ideally’ self-sufficient ‘manly’ man. Instead of “Socratic political philosophers,” the city in speech is ruled by a “mathematical philosophy” that prepares the brightest youths “for tyranny over the city,” an enforced homogeneity within each of the three classes.

    “In contrast to these philosophers, for whom the city is a cave they escape, Socrates gains clarity within the city…transcend[ing] his own political community in ways the philosophers of the cave image do not.” The erotic Socrates does not need to be dragged from the cave. Nor does he need to be dragged back to it. “What is needed is not the ridicule of philosophy that Aristophanes offers but a philosophic understanding of the city’s legitimate needs, as well as of its dangerous tendencies. Philosophy must be political in order to avoid being politicized.” The truly just man is “the lover of learning” who lives in the “dialogic community.”

    Socrates’ regime typology is not the kernel of a political science, as Bloom contends; there is no room for choice, deliberation—for statesmanship. Regimes decline inevitably, here. “Plato describes no decent politics in the Republic to which men can give their attention and loyalty…. Because the Republic offers knowledge of the perils of political action rather than knowledge useful in guiding politics, Aristophanes would find it unsatisfactory. As long as knowledge yields no more fruit than this”—the knowledge that one does not know and a consequent moderation in all things, including politics—”he might ask, why is knowledge better for men than the forgetting that comedy is intended to encourage?” Nichols now turns not, as one might expect, to Plato’s trilogy on knowledge and statesmanship, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman, nor to the other philosopher who wrote Socratic dialogues, Xenophon, but to Aristotle. This surprising turn more than suggests that Nichols has intends her book not merely as a scholarly investigation but a philosophic one.

    “Whereas Socrates founded political philosophy by undertaking a philosophic examination of human affairs, Aristotle founded political science by directing philosophy to political action”—”constitut[ing] an implicit defense of philosophy against Aristophanes’ criticism and of politics against Plato’s.” Against Aristophanes, Aristotle teaches that politics can and must “incorporate diversity.” Thus “thought and action correct each other,” with statesmen, and particularly lawgivers, providing “the bridge between thought and actual regimes.” Unlike Socrates, Aristotle does not direct his political teachings to the young. He is “the philosophic teacher of statesmen.” “Far from constituting a threat to the city’s unity, the philosopher can share in political life.” For Aristotle, politics is not based on a lie.

    There may be some problems with Nichols’ discussion of the philosopher-kings. For one thing, Socrates says so little about them as philosophers. their mathematical education does not make them un-Platonic (as distinguished from un-Socratic); the Academy itself is said to have warned away unmathematical souls. Moreover, Nichols believes that Socrates’ account of love as indiscriminate is obviously and deliberately wrong: A wine-lover does not love every kind of wine, as Socrates claims, as no one loves a bad wine. “The city’s communism could be successful, only if Socrates’ account of love were true: only if the guardians love all the members of a class” and therefore no individuals within it. But Nichols confuses kinds with intensity, here. A true wine lover loves all kinds of wine, but not poor specimens of those kinds; nor need he love all kinds equally. Socrates may be more kingly than Nichols says. Plato also teaches that a tyrannical soul may have been a potentially philosophic soul, now spoiled; tyrants and philosophers are opposites, but in another sense twins.

    The extent to which such reservations refute Nichols’ overall argument may be questioned. Only an exceptionally dogmatic soul could fail to learn from her book, and such souls are not the intended readership.

     

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    The Political Spirit

    January 7, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Catherine H. Zuckert, ed.: Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

    This is a combination of two reviews, originally published in the New York City Tribune, January 30, 1989 and in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 17, Number 1, Winter 1989-90.

     

    Rhetoric, election campaigns, even coups d’état and wars: Anger and ambition feed political life, sometimes intoxicating it. Catherine Zuckert reminds us that the Greek philosopher saw spiritedness or thumos as “the psychic origin of distinctively political action.” Political men seek justice, especially justice for themselves and ‘their own’family, friends, country. Politics often first comes to sight as self-defense, “the need people experience to defend their lives, lands, and liberty from the dominating desires of others.” The classical political philosophers understand the necessity, the benefits, the charms, and the dangers of politics.

    In association with reason, spiritedness makes man a political animal. Classical political thought asks, What shall we do with the wrath of Achilles? Without spiritedness or thumos, you have a city of pigs; with too much of it, you have civil war or tyranny—the self-destruction of the city. The destruction of Rome marked the end of the classical efforts to moderate thumos; neither Christianity nor modern political philosophy have ‘managed’ it in an entirely satisfactory way. Perhaps the most troublesome part of the human soul, thumos seeks not to be managed but to rule.

    Catherine H. Zuckert introduces this instructive collection of essays by observing that moderns “tend to take an economizing view of politics,” aiming at securing private rights and desires, emphasizing our individuality. Christianity contributed to this emphasis on the individual by replacing thumos with will; in Christianity punishment is a function o God, or of God’s instrument, the pagan magistrate. The old use of politics to form character declined, with character formation now centering in a different kind of political community, the Church; eventually, the very notion of character came to seem overly stern. Blocked from disciplining the desires, spiritedness rules the intellect, producing ideology—the use of ideas as weapons, instruments of conquest. The desire for a mental conquest of human beings drives totalitarian politics.

    Zuckert harbors no nostalgia for ‘the ancients’; the Aristotelian triumvirate of honors (distributive justice), friendship, and family requires small communities, and these tend to fight among themselves. As soon as one community finally wins the fight, a military imperialism rises, declines, and falls.

    The contributors to this volume discuss three ‘ancients’—Homer, Plato, Aristotle—and five ‘moderns’—Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The book’s one essay on non-philosophers considers the American Founders.

    Arlene Saxonhouse recounts Achilles’ discovery of the limits imposed on spiritedness by death, which he had hoped to overcome by achieving everlasting fame, a share of the immortality reserved for the gods. But “under the principles of universal equality in which no distinctions are made according to worth”—each of us equally must die—”the spirit of Achilles is not only moderated, it is killed.” Achilles’ love of Briseis, his measured acts of public honor for his dead friend Patroclus, and his reconciliation with Priam all reestablish a middle place for human being between gods and beasts.

    Mary P. Nichols writes that “Plato joins Homer in teaching the need for man to moderate his spiritedness,” although in a very different way. As does Homer, Plato sees that spiritedness rebels against death. In doing so, it defends but also threatens the city by its willingness to sacrifice and even life itself for the city’s sake—dealing out the very death it rebels against. Spiritedness also commits the soul entirely to the city, “against the truth that man needs something for his satisfaction that goes beyond the city, beyond what he can create and control.” Nichols recapitulates the argument of her book, Socrates and the Political Community, that the guardian-philosophers of the regime-in-speech of the Republic are more guardians than philosophers. Socrates, by contrast, “makes spiritedness gentle,” and takes account of the individuality of his interlocutors. This point should perhaps be qualified by noting that Socrates’ interlocutors for the most part represent human types, not individuals in the modern sense of the word, as a comparison of Plato’s characters with those of Dickens will show.

    Ann P. Charney relates courage to prudence, as understood by Aristotle. “Spiritedness combined with intellect is needed to philosophize in the face of knowledge of one’s ignorance about the gods.” Spiritedness also helps the intellect to moderate the appetites and fortifies the intellect in its quest for the truth behind and above conventions and opinions. The discovery of natural right allows men of strong intellect and character to act for the sake of the noble, and not merely for the sake of pleasing public opinion, whether popular or oligarchic. Aristotle carefully substitutes natural right for divine justice. Statesmen, too, can benefit; while carefully taking account of public opinion, the classical statesman can also resist it, and the classical political philosopher teaches him why he ought sometimes to resist. Charney may overestimate the place of friendship in this enterprise. Friendship cannot be “the core of political justice”; Aristotle explicitly teaches that friends do not treat each other with strict justice, instead inclining to ‘cronyism.’ But she is surely right to say that Aristotle’s great-souled man “replaces the Homeric heroes” and thereby makes political life more stable than Achilles could.

    Machiavelli is the first of the ‘moderns.’ In a witty and sobering essay, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. calls Machiavelli “the first writer on politics to use the word ‘execute’ frequently and thematically in the modern sense”—or, as Mansfield soon notes, its two modern senses. Mansfield contrasts seven characteristics of the modern Machiavellian executive with the classic Aristotelian statesman. Machiavelli downplays the role of deliberation, practical reasoning, in politics, and praises the use of force and fraud. He replaces the Aristotelian concept of political friendship with the concept of political conspiracy. “Primal fear” becomes “the first mover of politics”—not natural right and most assuredly not divine providence. Spiritedness rules Machiavellian politics, albeit with cleverness; conquest is the aim.

    Thomas Hobbes and John Locke progressively soften Machiavellian politics, without abandoning it. Hobbes shares Machiavelli’s cynicism about human nature but, as Timothy Fuller shows in a characteristically thoughtful essay, he finds the rule of law a better means to attain spirited ends. The very idea of the rule of law signifies to Hobbes “that mankind has been set free from divine tutelage and supposes that freedom and reason are mediated by human [not divine] will.” Spiritedness now inheres in law-abidingness; honor (spiritedness high-toned) and self-restraint combine to uphold law’s rule, and to preclude ‘personal’ rule. Civil liberty replaces natural liberty under the covenant or social contract. “The covenant is not, finally, a unique event but the paradigm of a lifetime of rational willing, the test of the enduring capacity for self-overcoming in civil association.” In this, Fuller offers the reader a more austere Hobbes than the cynical materialist of morals we normally view.

    John Locke tames spiritedness still further. David Lowenthal observes that for Locke, “conquest is never justified.” Locke’s state of nature is not so much a state of war, as in Hobbes, but a state of scarcity. In Locke, ‘economic man’ begins to come into his own. “With this sweeping contradiction of Hobbes, Locke lays the basis for thought on war that became the common sense of twentieth-century liberal societies,” with their “concepts of aggressor nations, reparations, wars of national liberation and national self-determination….” Lowenthal cautions that this project can endanger itself in two ways. If a liberal regime becomes too narrowly commercial and forgets to defend itself, it will perish by attack from other regimes that have not forgotten the martial spirit. And if a regime embraces the Lockean concept of national self-determination without Locke’s constitutional safeguards—a commercial economy, representative government—it will become a worse tranny than the traditional, ‘authoritarian’ regime it overthrew. Spiritlessness and excessive spiritedness both threaten the liberal regimes.

    Contemporary intellectuals decry the undramatic, ‘bourgeois’ virtues and vices of commercial republics. In this they imitate some of the late-modern political philosophers, the greatest of these being G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich Nietzsche. Michael Gillespie contributes a substantial essay on Hegel’s remedy for ’embourgeoisement.’ “Hegel doubts… that homo economicus can ever free himself from his desires and truly rule.” Left alone, bourgeois man will only sink deeper into decadence. If ‘History’ is not to grind to a halt before reaching its proper end or purpose, bourgeois man must be overcome, dialectically. Hegel proposes a serious, modern version of Socrates’ playfully constructed ‘republic.’ The bourgeoisie replaces the artisan class, soldiers replace the guardians, and bureaucrats replace the philosopher-kings. Not commerce but war “is the only viable restraint upon bourgeoisification and political degeneration,” strengthening “the rationality of the state by evoking the latent general will and community spirit of the citizenry.” War overcomes bourgeois individualism without returning to the tiny, now defenseless polis of antiquity. In the Hegelian dialectic, right makes might because that modern state which is the most autonomous and rational will prove stronger than its less advanced antagonists. Gillespie quite prudently judges Hegel over-optimistic about modern war and modern philosophic rationality.

    Nietzsche does not marry war and reason at shotgun-point. He celebrates “wild wisdom”—thought set free from logic, even from that most ambitious logic of Hegel. He dismisses moderation. Werner Dannhauser writes that Nietzsche exalts spiritedness over the other dimensions of the souls because only the most extreme spiritedness can affirm life even while embracing Nietzschean nihilism. “Courage is the quality of mind most needed by the mind as it faces the utter and comprehensive meaninglessness of life. That meaninglessness must be affirmed, lest the spirit of revenge corrode us and we face a hostile”—perhaps the better word is indifferent—”world with bitterness and resentment.” Dannhauser judges Nietzsche’s project humanly impossible, and rejects Nietzsche’s claim that man may overcome his own humanity.

    The deficiencies of late-modern political philosophy may prompt a reexamination of modernity’s most successful regime. Nathan Tarcov brings to this task a profound understanding of the Lockean political philosophy that influenced the American Founders more than any other. Locke, he observes, is not so ‘bourgeois’ as his critics contend. To assert rights, one makes “a spirited claim that there are duties both to respect others’ rights and to vindicate one’s own rights.” Some Thoughts Concerning Education “leaves room for properly educated spiritedness.” Pride in this combination of liberty and rationality forms the basis of morality; at the same time, love of dominion, that part of pride that spurs tyrants’ immorality, must be corrected and rechanneled. “Locke attempts to control the proud desire for mastery over others by satisfying the proud desire for liberty and mastery over oneself,” a mastery that wins the esteem of one’s fellow men and women.

    Tarcov compares the moral principles of the Declaration of Independence with Lockean morality. There is a major similarity: Both teach that the spirited by rational assertion of liberty “alone secures political happiness.” There is also a difference. To the Signers, spiritedness is “part of what entitles one to liberty,” and relates to honor—that  is, “gratitude to ancestors and responsibility to future generations.” This is why the Declaration culminates in a pledge of sacred honor among the people’s representatives, not among the people themselves; this is how would-be rulers show the virtue that will enable them to rule well. As for the people, consent is the key concept. Lack of popular spiritedness yields mere acquiescence; excess spiritedness fuels fanaticism. Consent—moderately spirited and reasonable—hits the mean between the extremes and provides a solid foundation for that rare thing, a politics of moderation in modernity.

    This highly instructive collection of essays would have been improved by the inclusion of a more thorough discussion of thumos as a psychological concept—this, perhaps, in the introduction or in an essay immediately following it. A comparison and contrast of the Platonic view of the soul with the Christian view would have added a needed dimension to the study, as well. The writers do an excellent job in showing how modern political philosophers have come full circle since Machiavelli liberated spiritedness from the intellectual apprehension of, and the ethical respect for, nature—how first they tamed spiritedness, then tamed it again. The moderns denied reason’s capacity to rule, yet insisted on overturning traditional customs and opinions. The results have not been encouraging. These studies clarify the reasons for these results, and thus invite further consideration of a perennial political problem.

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    FDR and Stalin

    January 6, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Robert Nisbet: Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Partnership. Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1988.

    Originally published in The Washington Times, March 20, 1989.

     

    Erstwhile Republican Party presidential candidate Wendell Willkie visited Stalin during World War II. “Stalin likes a pretty heavy turnover of young people in his immediate entourage,” Willkie perceived. “It is his way, I think, of keeping his ear to the ground.”

    To smile at such ineffable naivete smacks somewhat of Oscar Wilde laughing at the death of Little Nell: It is an altogether better response to a work of fiction than to events in the real world. Too-Olympian gaiety may land one in jail, or bring on some other severe test of good humor. Although Socrates triumphed at this, purchasing a sort of intellectual immortality at the cost of his physical demise, moderns (like Wilde) typically bring fewer spiritual resources to the test, ending pitiably.

    In political extremities, laughter makes sense only for philosophers and tyrants. Stalin understood this, and held up the tyrants’ end. When American First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy met Charles de Gaulle at the French embassy in Washington, she asked, “General, of all the great men you have met, which one had the best sense of humor?” “Stalin, madame,” the General intoned. Willkie found that out, too: “Once I was telling him of the Soviet schools and libraries I had seen—how good they had seemed to me. And I added, ‘But if you continue to educate the Russian people, Mr. Stalin, the first thing you know you’ll educate yourself out of a job.’ He threw back his head and laughed. Nothing I said to him, or heard anyone else say to him, through two long evenings, seemed to amuse him so much.”

    Still, there were limits even to Stalinist mirth. De Gaulle remembered, “Stalin said only one serious thing to me: ‘In the end, death is the only winner.'” Like any serious political man, Stalin wanted to win, so he made himself into an angel of death, a transfiguration that may account for the turnover of young people in his immediate entourage.

    “Stalin was an unnatural man,” Winston Churchill said. Why did Churchill and de Gaulle see this, while Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not? ‘American innocence,’ Europeans will answer, forgetting that Stalin (and Hitler) duped more Europeans than Americans, and as a result killed more of them, too.

    Name one 18th- or 19th-century American statesman who would not have recognized Stalin for what he was. The old republicans suspected political power, jealously guarded themselves against usurpations of their rights. Many 20th-century democrats trust, almost worship state power. They fawn over tyrants, not merely hoping to overcome the will-to-death with the will-to-love (Christian hope centers on that possibility) not only hoping (much less plausibly) to make Christian love politically successful, but actually mistaking the tyrannical will-to-death for a vigorous program of social improvement.

    Noted conservative author Robert Nisbet brings out this tragicomic theme of unrequited love, calling Roosevelt’s policy toward Stalin a “failed courtship.” Why was it even attempted?

    Nisbet narrates the matter concisely. “The Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939,” Nisbet writes, “was a jolt to the White House and the liberal mind in America.” Peace between the world’s arch-‘reactionary’ regime and the Fatherland of the Revolution, at the expense of European democracy, was supposed to have been the stuff of red-baiters hallucinations.

    Less than two years later Hitler ended the embarrassment by betraying Stalin (who, like all con artists, couldn’t believe anyone would make a sucker out of him). This caused a new dilemma, one more amenable to a purely rhetorical solution. “The war,” Nisbet writes, “could no longer be called one of ‘democracy’ vs. totalitarianism.'” It was decided to call Leftist totalitarianism protodemocracy. FDR’s most trusted advisor, Harry Hopkins, “regretted that the Soviet Union tended toward totalitarianism, but he was hopeful for its future, given its egalitarian philosophy.” So was Roosevelt.

    After fulsomely welcoming Stalin to the alliance, Roosevelt “fought hard to offset, to root out, American—especially religious—dislike of the Soviets.” At one memorable press conference, he cited Article 124 of the “Constitution of Russia” (as he called it), which guaranteed “freedom of religion.” Nisbet rightly identifies this as a deliberate lie by a rhetorician who assumed the American people would never fight unless they imagined some stark contrast between Nazis and Communists. Predictably, it didn’t take too long for the rhetorician to start listening to himself. After the notorious Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt baptized Stalin (who had studied for the priesthood) as something of a “Christian gentleman” in behavior if not conviction.

    Many conservatives have denounced Yalta as the place where Roosevelt sacrificed Eastern Europe; Nisbet sees that substantial concessions had already occurred in Teheran in November 1943, where, “in less than an hour the President had given [Stalin] what he wanted in Poland and the Baltic States.” In return, Roosevelt demanded a “plebiscite” in those countries to determine their rulers; Stalin quickly agreed, stipulation that elections would be held “in accordance with the Soviet constitution.” The two men further agreed in disliking France generally, de Gaulle in particular, and the British Empire—all bulwarks against any future Soviet expansion, not so incidentally. Yalta performed the different yet “invaluable service of giving moral legitimation to what Stalin had acquired by sheer force,” compelling East Europeans to abandon democracy and sovereignty in the name of democracy and sovereignty. “Of one thing I am certain,” FDR concluded. “Stalin is not an imperialist.”

    Churchill was an imperialist. Imperialism was ‘reactionary.’ Therefore, FDR deduced, Soviet communism must offer a greater potential for democracy than the British Empire. Churchill replied, “British imperialism has spread, and is spreading democracy more widely than any other system of government since the beginning of time.” FDR failed to see things that way, telling his son (in an incident Nisbet does not mention) that the end of British and French imperialism would bring unheard-of wealth to the United States and the democracies generally.

    Nisbet finds the “intellectual roots” of Rooseveltian illusions regarding Leftist totalitarianism in the thought of Woodrow Wilson, whom FDR had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the First World War. “Making the world safe for democracy” meant making it safe from the old empires whose ambitions had ignited that war. “It never occurred to Roosevelt to see the structure of Soviet society as being close to that of Nazi Germany, as, in other words, totalitarian in both cases.” The new liberalism of Wilson and Roosevelt was a boneless liberalism. It admired not stability under prudently designed institutions but forward flow, resolute ‘progress,’ a secular equivalent of the Holy Spirit called ‘History.’

    Without the resistance of stable institutions or individuals who claim unalienable, natural rights, progressivism seeks discipline from ‘leaders.’ For the new statesmen, leadership replaces governing. Nisbet remarks that FDR’s unconstitutional “National Recovery Act” would have further empowered the president. When the Supreme Court struck it down, Roosevelt made one of his few unpopular domestic moves, trying to add to the number of justices in order to pack the Court with progressives. FDR wanted constitutions, American or ‘Russian,’ to mean what he said they meant, the better to lead Americans where he wanted them to go.

    De Gaulle considered Roosevelt a man whose idealism cloaked ambition, first of all from Roosevelt’s own eyes. Roosevelt never saw the dangers of Marxist ideology because his own ideology resembled it. Marxism and progressivist liberalism share a genealogy—not simply “socialism, populism, nationalism, and the whole idea of ‘redemptive revolution,'” as Nisbet writes, and not only a dreamed-of egalitarian society, but an underlying commitment to the Left-Hegelian current of German historicism. In the highest sense, Germany had already conquered Russia’s and America’s ‘Left’ elites before a shot was fired—in World War I, let alone World War II.

    Hegel had responded philosophically to the Christian critique of both classical and modern rationalism. Reason—thought animated by the principle of non-contradiction—appears too rigid, in Hegel’s view, to account for the Holy Spirit that blows where it listeth, giving eternal life as surely as the breath of God animated clay on the sixth day of Creation. Replacing the Holy Spirit of the providential, Creator-God who rules the course of events from a position ‘above’ it, with the ‘Absolute Spirit’ he held to be immanent in all things, Hegel invents a logic that eschews the principle of non-contradiction in the classical sense. ‘History’ becomes the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute Spirit. In Hegelian or ‘historical’ logic, contradictory forces and things at first clash but then combine or ‘synthesize’ to produce new and higher forms of life, including human beliefs, thoughts, customs, and institutions. The stable structure or forms of nature as conceived by previous philosophers give way to movement, fluidity, a series of historical changes that will eventuate in the ‘end of history,’ the culmination of all previous events into one coherent and stable whole.

    It seems paradoxical to find that this attempt to do justice to life would itself ‘evolve’ into the most malignant, death-dealing political ‘movements,’ Nazism and communism. This happened because what gives human life its movement is usually not reason but passion. In becoming ‘dialectical’ in the evolutionary, Hegelian way, thinking became impassioned. In politics, where the spirited passions of indignation, ambition, and rage predominate, this can easily lead to death, and on a mass scale. The spirited passions blinded and used the reasoning powers which might have corrected them. Reason in effect blinded itself by imitating passions, by denying itself the very power of abstraction which enables human beings to detach themselves from their passions and to judge. This is why historicists of all varieties denounce ‘abstraction,’ make a fetish of ‘concrete’ thinking and, even more resolute action guided only be ‘concrete,’ i.e., immanent thought. In the end, death is the only winner. With neither a Creator-God nor rational human minds capable of rising above the course of events to judge them, whatever ‘is’ is right.

    Under the aegis of certain forms of historicism, fatality animated modern tyranny or totalitarianism. I mean by this fatality both in the sense of something held to be inevitable, irresistible, and something that ends in death. Churchill and de Gaulle knew this, or at least sensed it, and they resisted it, in both its Leftist and Rightist forms. In alliance with Roosevelt, they defeated the Rightist form. They lacked the power to block Roosevelt’s immediate designs in misjudged alliance with the Leftist form. They did succeed in delaying those designs and in limiting their effects. Today we live on the political and strategic margin provided by statesmen who understood totalitarianism better than progressives can. Statesmen can widen that margin only if they attend to the lasting structures of regimes, to whether and how those structures actually secure the rights of individual human beings.

    Filed Under: American Politics

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