Will Morrisey Reviews

Book reviews and articles on political philosophy and literature.

  • Home
  • Reviews
    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
  • Contents
  • About
  • Books

Recent Posts

  • Pascal Against the Jesuits
  • Medieval “Cures” for Modern Madness
  • Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: America Under the Nixon Administration
  • Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: Germany and Britain
  • Diplomacy as Practiced by ‘Great Powers’: France and Austria at Their Apogees

Recent Comments

    Archives

    • March 2026
    • February 2026
    • January 2026
    • December 2025
    • November 2025
    • October 2025
    • September 2025
    • August 2025
    • July 2025
    • June 2025
    • May 2025
    • April 2025
    • March 2025
    • February 2025
    • January 2025
    • December 2024
    • November 2024
    • October 2024
    • September 2024
    • August 2024
    • July 2024
    • June 2024
    • May 2024
    • April 2024
    • March 2024
    • February 2024
    • January 2024
    • December 2023
    • November 2023
    • October 2023
    • September 2023
    • August 2023
    • July 2023
    • June 2023
    • May 2023
    • April 2023
    • March 2023
    • February 2023
    • January 2023
    • December 2022
    • November 2022
    • October 2022
    • September 2022
    • August 2022
    • July 2022
    • June 2022
    • May 2022
    • April 2022
    • March 2022
    • February 2022
    • January 2022
    • December 2021
    • November 2021
    • October 2021
    • September 2021
    • August 2021
    • July 2021
    • June 2021
    • May 2021
    • April 2021
    • March 2021
    • February 2021
    • January 2021
    • December 2020
    • November 2020
    • October 2020
    • September 2020
    • August 2020
    • July 2020
    • June 2020
    • May 2020
    • April 2020
    • March 2020
    • February 2020
    • January 2020
    • December 2019
    • November 2019
    • October 2019
    • September 2019
    • August 2019
    • July 2019
    • June 2019
    • May 2019
    • April 2019
    • March 2019
    • February 2019
    • January 2019
    • December 2018
    • November 2018
    • October 2018
    • September 2018
    • August 2018
    • July 2018
    • June 2018
    • May 2018
    • April 2018
    • March 2018
    • February 2018
    • January 2018
    • December 2017
    • November 2017
    • September 2017
    • August 2017
    • July 2017
    • June 2017
    • May 2017
    • April 2017
    • March 2017
    • February 2017
    • January 2017
    • December 2016
    • November 2016
    • September 2016
    • August 2016
    • July 2016
    • June 2016
    • April 2016
    • March 2016
    • February 2016
    • January 2016

    Categories

    • American Politics
    • Bible Notes
    • Manners & Morals
    • Nations
    • Philosophers
    • Remembrances
    • Uncategorized

    Meta

    • Log in
    • Entries feed
    • Comments feed
    • WordPress.org

    Powered by Genesis

    Archives for January 2018

    German Reunification

    January 30, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    By the end of 1989, reunification of the two German regimes—the Federal Republic of Germany (‘West Germany’) and the German Democratic Republic (‘East Germany’) had become both highly probable and controversial. At the end of World War II, Soviet-occupied East Germany was ruled by Stalin, through an especially brutal and efficient local Communist Party, whereas West Germany became a commercial republic, albeit with a strong presence of American, French, and British military forces on the ground—the nucleus of the NATO alliance. Although the former capital city, Berlin, was located entirely within the East German sector, it was itself divided between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ section; eventually, the Communist regime built the Berlin Wall as a means of preventing their subjects from escaping to the West.

    As the Soviet empire began to collapse in 1989, it became clear that divided Germany was no longer tenable. However, memories of the Nazi tyranny and two world wars died hard, and several heads of state opposed reunification. These included Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir, who raised fears of another Holocaust, and, more realistically, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterand, who could not bring themselves to relish the prospect of a newly-empowered Germany in the heart of Europe. Thatcher and Mitterand also worried that German reunification would damage Russian political support for Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev, with whom they had established a comfortable working relationship. This proved not at all unrealistic, as the loss of the Soviet empire did indeed tend to undermine Gorbachev, who would not survive German reunification for very long.

    In December 1989, I wrote the following essay on reunification, which was distributed by Dawn Publishing Company, a firm in Quebec, Canada, to a network of readers interested in international politics.

     

    With respect to German reunification, whatever our opinions may be, things will proceed regardless of what non-Germans think. If the Germans want reunification, they will have it. The only power on earth that can stop them is the Soviet Union.. German reunification, at the price of German neutrality in the Cold War, has been a Soviet goal all along. Why should the Kremlin intervene now? I expect them to bargain hard for concessions with respect not only to neutrality but NATO troops.

    If he can accomplish that, Gorbachev will thereby consolidate his power. He will be able to say to his critics: ‘My honey caught more flies in a few years than your vinegar did in nearly four decades. Now, if you want to oust me and eliminate my reforms, do you really intend to reconquer eastern Europe? Because if you do not reconquer eastern Europe, reinstating the old system here at home will only serve to impoverish us still further, as we will lack colonies to exploit.’

    Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir opposes German reunification. But should he?

    Let’s step back for a moment and consider what the disintegration of communism in eastern Europe may mean, in terms of political principles. By now it is clear that thinkers of the twentieth century have yet to discover a single new political principle, although some modern tyrannies have invented the institutional and technological means to enhance the power of tyranny so much as to merit a new term, ‘totalitarian,’ to describe them. (Twentieth-century political thinkers have discovered, or, more precisely, systematized one new political method: Gandhiism or nonviolent resistance, as distinguished from Christian nonresistance. But this method has been used entirely at the service of principles or ideas that predated it—e.g., nationalism in India, the extension of full citizenship to African-Americans, and so on.) This century has instead served as a sort of laboratory in which two rival sets of political hypotheses were tested. ‘Laboratory’ is a metaphor that misses the absence of any control, scientific or other, over the various experiments that have occurred, but let it stand.

    The great commercial-republican political philosophers (Locke, Montesquieu, Smith) sought to end the religious strife that had wracked Christian Europe. They formulated new institutions designed to re-channel religio-military spiritedness into business affairs and representative government. The solution works, generally speaking; commercial republics still have wars, but never with one another. As a by-product, commercial republicanism diluted anti-Jewish hatred, legitimizing the financial and commercial function Jews had been more or less forced into by the Christian churches by effectually repealing strict laws against ‘usury.’ Jewish people know this; since the Enlightenment, many of them have adopted some form of ‘liberalism.’

    Hegel and other nineteenth-century Germans despised this ‘philosophy of shopkeepers.’ In this they followed but also radicalized Kant, who followed Rousseau, that great modern anti-bourgeois. The German ideologies of nationalism, communism, and racism are little more than vulgarized versions of Hegelianism. Sometimes they compete with one another, accusing each other of ‘bourgeois reaction’ (Bolshevism’s critique of fascism) or ‘Jewishness’ (Nazism’s counter-charge against Bolshevism). At least as often, they cooperate, as in the Soviet Union, where Jew-hatred and anti-‘capitalism’ mix quite easily, as indeed they also do in Marx’s essay, “On the Jewish Question.” According to the Germans and their disciples worldwide, the concept of ‘History’—said to be profound, comprehensive, and dynamic—must replace the concept of modern natural right—based upon the ‘state of nature,’ which ideologists of the ‘German’ schools condemn as ‘ahistorical’ in two senses: it is fiction, and it is static, unable to account for change.

    Historicists have looked forward to the confirmation of their hypothesis (where else?) in history. This is precisely what history has denied them. Real history, that is, experience, vindicates the allegedly superficial ‘eighteenth-century thought’ and proves the deep-thinking ‘nineteenth-century’ profoundly wrong. Experience, not theory, shows that there really is a state of nature, a place of war and scarcity which reappears whenever tyrants seize power in the name of some grand idea-scheme. Experience, not theory, shows that real economic dynamism comes from commercial republicanism, not from the destructive dynamics of the Nazis or the Byzantine immobility of the very ‘progressive’ U. S. S. R., whose only capacity to effect change has been as midwife to subversion in poverty-stricken despotisms. ‘Midwife’ again is the wrong metaphor; after all, the offspring bears the genetic traits of the Soviet system as much as the less indecent traits of the unfortunate mother country.

    A united, commercial-republican Germany, surrounded by other commercial republics, signifies the practical refutation of ‘Germanism.’ Friends of freedom should work to ensure that ‘Germans’ the world over understand this, and do not forget it. Commercial-republic Europe will face to potential threats, one external, the other internal. Gorbachev recently reaffirmed his adherence to communism. His giant empire may rest its ambitions; it will not abandon them until it ceases to be an empire. Unless and until the Soviets become commercial republicans, Europe will be at hazard. In the meantime, if NATO and the Warsaw Pact both dissolve, the Soviets will increase their relative power, given their obvious geopolitical advantage over the United States: access to Europe by land.

    Internally, the religious toleration commercial republicanism enforces often leads to a flaccid toleration of anti-republican political movements; moral relativism and spirited nihilism unwittingly collaborate. To some extent, ‘Germanism’ arose because commercial republicanism could not offer the intense spiritual satisfactions found in the religiously-buttressed despotisms and constitutional monarchies it replaced. These satisfactions were perverted or ‘secularized’ by the anti-religious ideologies that partially replaced Christianity and Judaism in the West. To a certain degree, this is inevitable. The United States houses all manner of bizarre cults; the best that can be said is, none of them gets very far. Therefore, strong religious institutions will remain indispensable as shields against both moral indifferentism and fanaticism. Easter Europe, as in the United States of 1787, has seen churches that fight for commercial republicanism, in the knowledge that it will lead them in peace. They must also learn better to guard themselves against the temptations inherent in the commercial-republican way of life.

    The fear associated with German reunification is that Christian religious revival can include Jew-hatred. This is where Israel can seize what Herr Hegel would call a world-historical opportunity. As the only commercial republic in the Mideast with unique historical links to Germany, to Eastern Europe, and to Russia, Israel should reverse Shamir’s position and endorse German reunification. In doing so, however, it must make clear that Jews and Christians can flourish within commercial-republican regimes. ‘Never again’ must Jews or Christians entertain ideologies that subvert this regime. Such ideologies cause holocausts.

    As it happens, Muslims do not seem nearly so ‘compatible’ with commercial republicanism. The only other commercial republic in the Mideast was Lebanon, ruled by a Christian minority; it disintegrated under pressure from Muslims. This raises questions about the capacity of the PLO to bring genuine self-government anywhere. What, exactly, does the PLO intend to establish in ‘Palestine’? A ‘democratic,’ secular state, they say, but given the abuses the word ‘democracy’ suffers (as in ‘German Democratic Republic’), it is impossible to view this rhetorical smoke with anything other than suspicion. The intifada, which is nothing less than an attempt to ‘Lebanonize’ Israel, can and must be suppressed as part of a comprehensive plan to defend not merely ‘the Jewish state’ (a concept many non-Jews will quite understandably view with indifference) but commercial republicanism, and therefore peace, in the Mideast.

    A strong statement of support for German national aspirations under a commercial-republican regime can win friends in Germany and the United States, so long as that statement intelligently clarifies the character of those aspirations. Far more important, it would provide a chance to set forth a standard or a framework for a genuine political settlement, by establishing the point that Israel is the model for Mideast politics. Israeli officials never say what would need to happen in the surrounding states in order to establish a just and lasting peace. The lesson of North America, the lesson of Europe, is, ‘If you want peace, surround yourself with commercial republics.’ This puts the pressure on the Muslim regimes, where it belongs. It enables statesmen, journalists, clergy, and other interested persons to ask the Muslims, ‘What are you doing, concretely, to promote peace in the one proven and lasting way, the way of commercial republicanism?’ In such an atmosphere, an Israeli proposal to partition both Lebanon and Jordan so as to produce four commercial republics in those two countries, would be quite reasonable. Realistic? Of course not. But why not? Because too many Muslims want theocracy more than they want peace. Indeed, the define ‘peace,’ Islam, as theocracy. The world does not yet sufficiently appreciate this. But now that the world does finally acknowledge the benefits of commercial republicanism, it can begin to appreciate it.

    Unfortunately, Israel’s social-democratic founders were themselves too ‘German,’ and many of its leading politicians continue to be. Socialism and/or nationalism has preoccupied them. For this reason, Israelis today tend to obscure the issues in their own minds. They worry about a reunified Germany on nationalist grounds, instead of seeing the opportunities it presents politically. They tend to think more in terms of ‘Germans-versus-Jews’ than in terms of tyranny versus commercial republicanism. The example of the Weimar Republic—the ill-conceived product of a punitive war settlement—should not be taken as decisive. When Israelis do appeal to ‘fellow democrats’ around the world they are too sentimental, too vulnerable to the claim that they contradict themselves by opposing a ‘Palestinian’ state. Luckily for them, Muslims are even more muddled, and send even more violently mixed signals.

    Filed Under: Nations

    Strauss on Political Philosophy

    January 29, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    Hilail Gildin, ed.: An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989.
    Thomas L. Pangle, ed.: The Rebirth of Classical Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.

    Originally published in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy. Volume 17, Number 3, Spring 1990. Republished by permission.

     

    “One cannot settle any Platonic question of any consequence by simply quoting Plato,” (Pangle, 193) writes Leo Strauss. Strauss titles a collection of his essay, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy; insofar as Strauss Platonizes, he must be quoted with care. Quoting Plato or Strauss with care means to quote them in the spirit of evidence, in the spirit of ‘pointing to,’ not in the spirit of demonstration, of ‘Q.E.D.’ He who knows he does not know will unfailingly frustrate those who want to know what to believe as well as those who know what they want to believe. The frustration and even suspicion Strauss stirs in dogmatic souls has found ample ventilation in a variety of journals and books. Those readers for whom controversy arouses curiosity instead of indignation may seek firsthand knowledge of Strauss from Strauss’s writings.

    Hilail Gildin’s collection will serve as an excellent place to begin. This new edition contains four additional essays: Strauss’s own brief introduction to political philosophy, one on the theologico-political question, and two on liberal education. Gildin’s introduction succinctly outlines Strauss’s principal concerns as a politicl philosopher, particularly the way in which modern political philosophers brought out the nihilistic implications of Machiavell’s thought in ever more elaborate forms, and the consequent need for a renewed radicalism, so to speak—recourse to the Socratic roots of political philosophy.

    Strauss adopted the Socratic view of philosophy as first of all a way of life, even the way of life—the highest form of politics or self-rule. This view regards human life as needful of wisdom, as rightly animated by love of wisdom, the quest for knowledge of the whole. Even the vast majority of human beings, who are unphilosophic and content to stay that way, in some sense need philosophy; the political good requires education of qualified young persons for philosophic life, not only for political life as conventionally understood in a given regime. At the same time, philosophers need to start with political life as conventionally understood, to treat citizens’ opinions as portals to understanding, not as barriers to be knocked down. Socratic philosophy contrasts sharply with historicism, which begins with Rousseau’s rejection of the naturalness of reasons and issues in the divorce of ‘ought’ from ‘is’ in the name of realism. For radical historicism, even reality becomes an ‘ism.’ After Nietzsche refuted optimistic historicist progressivism, only self-conscious nihilism remained. The modern attempt to dismiss ideal republics and cities of God in order to free man for reshaping nature to his own liking, ended in a rebirth of tragedy, first with, then without, nobility. “The attempt to make man absolutely at home in this world ended in man’s becoming absolutely homeless” (108).

    Modernity often fuses reason to spiritedness, forming ideology and propaganda. Socrates associate reason with eros, not spiritedness, seeking a self-sufficiency that need not harm (or directly help) the philosopher’s fellow-citizens. Only force or, perhaps, a form of love, patriotism, could induce the philosopher to participate in politics. In his essays on liberal education we see Strauss as a kind of statesman, indeed as a reformer describing “the necessary endeavor to found an aristocracy within democratic mass society” (314). This language will exercises egalitarians among Strauss’s critics, who may overlook his call for “unhesitating loyalty” to decent constitutionalism (345). Or, what is more likely, perhaps some critics balk at constitutionalism itself, and at Strauss’s observation, made in the same breath, that the “grandiose failures” of Marx and Nietzsche should teach us never to separate wisdom from moderation. Be this as it may, even at his most ‘political’ Strauss never fails to point to philosophy, to the awareness of our understanding the philosopher may enjoy, beyond the ambitions of the modern project.

    Strauss crafted each of his published essays to stand alone and also, in most instances, to stand within a book. A cautious reader will therefore approach Professor Gildin’s collection with some reservations, concerned that the act of extracting essays form their original contexts will somehow lose many intended resonances. Such fears prove needless here. Gildin has given us a real book, one whose chapters lead logically from one to another, making a coherent argument. Even readers familiar with these essays may find these new juxtapositions instructive. The book’s only shortcoming is its bibliography, which has not been updated since the 1975 edition. If there is another printing, the publisher might consider making this useful revision.

    Thomas Pangle’s collection first calls attention not to Strauss as political philosopher but to Strauss as philosopher, to Strauss’s “classical rationalism” or “erotic skepticism” (xi-xii). In this, however, Pangle is as politic as Gildin, given current academic interest (bordering on obsession) with things epistemological. The volume may give Strauss a hearing before those who expect the philosopher to ‘do philosophy’ rather than to ‘know himself’ or to ‘live philosophically.’

    In his introduction Pangle quickly brings his readers to politics, to the way epistemology and politics intertwine. “Norms of civic justice, of civic virtue and vice,” emerge from dialogue (xii). Not absolute in the sense that natural laws or categorical imperatives are said to be, they are nonetheless trans-historically valid because they are grounded in unchanging human nature. Modern philosophers attempt to lay down laws evident to non-philosophers, reducing observation, prudence, and classification to methods and rules. ‘Method-ists’ want to overcome the need for both kinds of wisdom, practical and theoretical, and thereby rigidify both politics and philosophy, including the liberal education of potential statesmen and philosophers.

    In the United States during Strauss’s lifetime there was much talk of ‘humanism’ as an alternative to totalitarian ideology. Strauss saw that humanism cannot replace the traditional religion as the foundation of morality in commercial republican society, even among the academic elites. Humanism cannot account for the whole of being, as may be seen in Isaiah Berlin’s concept of “negative freedom” or “freedom from,” which needs an absolute foundation but denies itself one on principle (7, 16-17). And even the self-created limits favored by existentialists cannot be seen as limits without “the light of infinity” (38). After the Nazi disaster convinced Heidegger that “contempt for reasonableness and praise of resoluteness” (30) quickly run themselves aground., Heidegger retained his contempt for reason but added patience. His patient ‘waiting-for’ a religion that cannot be consciously created, produced the atmosphere of our own time, called by André Malraux, “the days of limbo.”

    Classical political rationalism begins with political opinions but seeks a conversion to truth, away from lies (however noble). “The political man is constantly forced to have very long conversations with very dull people on very dull subjects” (74). he philosophic life avoids much of that, without losing all moderation, and without losing its sense of humor. (“Modern research on Plato originated in Germany, the country without comedy” [206]; too many commentators on Strauss are German, all too German.) Philosophic life begins in wonder; Biblical wisdom begins with fear of the Lord; modernity, which has tried “to preserve Biblical morality while abandoning Biblical faith,” loses philosophic and Biblical virtues (240). Because Western civilization lives in the relation between ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem,’ radical modernity tends toward the disintegration of the West. Contemporary ideologues who chant for the purging of writings by ‘dead, white, European males’ from university syllabi know what they don’t want, sort of. The spirit of Strauss in the pages of these books counsels us to react to such incantations with neither indignation nor dismissive laughter: “The recognition by philosophy of the fact that the human race is worthy of some seriousness is the origin of political philosophy or political science” (126). (Emphasis added and, it is to be hoped, balance observed.)

    Filed Under: Philosophers

    The First Amendment, Misunderstood

    January 27, 2018 by Will Morrisey

    In July 1990, Red Bank, New Jersey political activist William Davis wrote a letter to the editor of The Register, a daily newspaper published in nearby Shrewsbury, New Jersey. Davis commented on a decision by Howard E. Cook, a Gwinnett County, Georgia judge who ruled that state law banning the wearing of masks intended for purposes of intimidation or criminality (in this instance, the mask worn by Ku Klux Klan members) was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Davis called the decision “resoundingly correct,” an act adhering to “the dictates of the law”—a Constitution that originally held “certain folks to be only a little more than half human.”

    My reply, dated August 8, 1990, rebutted Mr. Davis’s argument.

     

    In his justifiable indignation at the Ku Klux Klan, Mr. William Davis of Red Bank has misstated the principle and intentions of the Framers of the United States Constitution.

    The Georgia judge who ruled that Klan members have a First Amendment right to wear their ludicrous costumes (including masks to conceal their identities) was not necessarily “following the dictates of the law,” as Mr. Davis supposes. The prohibition, “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble”—even if this may be applied to legislation drafted by municipal and state lawmakers—does not shield dress-up racists preaching sedition. There are three reasons to question the judge’s reading of the First Amendment, and the regrettable body of legal opinion upon which his decision is based.

    First, costuming isn’t speech. Alothough judges who prefer writing laws to interpreting them now chatter about ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘symbolic speech,’ you won’t find those formulas in the writings of the Framers. They said “speech”—not “fashion statements.” To the Framers, clothes most emphatically did not make the man. God and nature do, and reasoned speech is the unmistakable sign of that handiwork.

    Second, freedom of speech is a civil liberty; that is, it partakes no only of liberty, but of civility. Freedom isn’t license, as a rather libertarian British educator [A. S. Neill] used to say. All forms of Constitutionally protected speech are civil. Constitutionally unprotected speech, speech fundamentally subversive of civil society, includes terroristic threats, obscenity, disruptions of public meetings, and so on. (It’s too bad that the American Civil Liberties Union exalts liberty while forgetting the civility that makes it possible, and thus mistakes what ‘American’ means.) The Klan’s history of terrorism clearly falls outside the limits of civil society.

    Third, as Mr. Davis correctly observes, “the Klan has always regarded” certain ethnic and religious groups, including African-Americans, Jews, and Roman Catholics, “as subhuman beings.” But Davis misses the legal implication of this. Klan bigotry subverts each of the stated purposes of the Constitution: “to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” Klan bigotry also contradicts the underlying principle of the Constitution set down in the Declaration of Independence: “that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” The Ku Klux Klan is a subversive organization practicing sedition speech, verbal and ‘symbolic.’ A proper understanding of the Constitution would permit legislators to outlaw such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan. Whether or not to act on such Constitutional permission should be a matter governed by prudential calculation of the likely results, not judicial interference.

    Mr. Davis thus fails to see the resources our Constitution provides to Americans who oppose racist politics. Part of the problem is his uncritical acceptance of a polemical thrust made by James Baldwin and others who claim that the Framers regarded the slave (in Davis’ words) as “only a little more than half human” or (as Baldwin put it) as “three-fifths of a man.” Were this true, the Framers would rank only a cut or two above the Klan in overall intelligence and humanity. Fortunately, the interpretation is a falsehood amply refuted by an examination of the Constitution itself. Unfortunately, this falsehood still enjoys currency among people who should know better.

    Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution as originally written apportions representatives and direct taxes among the states according to a population formula “determined by adding the whole number of free persons,” including bonded apprentices, excluding “Indians not taxed,” and including “three-fifths of the [population of] all other persons”—i.e., slaves. The formula was written this way because representatives of [predominantly] free states objected to the additional representatives slave state would have acquired, had the full slave population of those states been included. The slaveholders, obviously, wanted their slaves counted as if they were full citizens, as this would have maximized the power of the slaveholding states in Congress.

    It is, of course, the lasting shame of the slaveholders that they perpetuated slavery, and the lasting misfortune of the United States that the slaveholders had the power to make their ‘peculiar institution’ last as long as it did. But the sentiments of the majority of the Framers should not be obscured. In his Address at Cooper Union, New York City, on February 27, 1860, Abraham Lincoln showed that only two of the 39 signers of the United States Constitution ever acted to forbid Congressional prohibition of slavery in the federal territories—a prohibition understood by pro-slavery and anti-slavery partisans alike as fatal in the long run to slavery everywhere in the Union. The Framers deliberately left intact the very engine that could dismantle slavery. During the founding period, many of the most prominent slaveholders in the South (e.g., George Washington and Thomas Jefferson) sought feasible ways to put slavery on the road to extinction. Although the slaveholders denied it, the Constitution itself as written (and, most emphatically, not as distorted by the majority of the Supreme Court in its infamous Dred Scott decision) proved the supreme instrument of slavery’s extinction, in the hands of a great statesman guided by the principles of the Declaration, even as the Framers were.

    Pro-slavery passions hardened in the 19th century, partly as a reaction to the denunciations of radical abolitionists, partly as a response to slavery’s increased economic benefits to slaveholders after the invention of the cotton gin, and partly in the wake of nationalist and racist ideologies spawned not in American, but in continental Europe. None of these phenomena may fairly be traced to the principles of the American Founders. The commercial-republican regime embodied in the Constitution works toward the abolition of tyranny in all its forms, and under all its masks.

    Mr. Davis concludes, “The Klan should wear their masks not as a First Amendment right, but as a sentence.” Agreed. But he should add that this sentence would be Constitutionally sound if preceded by the Klansmen’s arrest, unmasking, and trial by juries supervised by judges who understand Constitutional principles.

     

    2018 Note: Judge Cook’s ruling was reversed later that year by the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Miller (1990).

    Filed Under: American Politics

    • « Previous Page
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
    • …
    • 7
    • Next Page »